7. In the opinion of local authorities, its violation against performing a realistic local autonomy and repetitive inspections.
relationship between local authorities and the nation, the dependence of local authorities on government finance, and the insufficient number of self-inspections carried out by local authorities, abolition of inspections by the National Assembly becomes harder to accept. In fact, even if inspections of local authorities are carried out by the Board of Audit and Inspection or the Executive Department, it is difficult to deny the existence of valuable inspection functions that monitor the responsibility and efficiency of local authorities in a way that does not damage local self-governance, especially when the agent of such inspections is the National Assembly, the practical executive instrument and delegate of the (Lim, 2011: 47) . Since the parliamentary inspection system was reintroduced in 1987 it has been perceived as a very effective system whereby the 한국지방자치학회보, 제27권 제1호(통권89호), 2015. 3 3 National Assembly can watch and control the government, yet criticisms have been made that during the past 25 years it has created disruption between ruling and opposition parties concerning party interests, owing to the brevity of the inspection period and inadequate inspections caused by the overwhelming number of agencies receiving inspection. Criticisms have also focused on the burden inspected agencies had to bear, owing to the inspection's tendency to punish any wrongdoing and request excessive data submission, and its lack of effort in solving problems.
Since the local autonomy system was revived beginning with the 1991 local council, local government inspections have exposed many problems, including conflict between local councils and the National Assembly, and have also cast doubts on the system's effectiveness. That is, from the National Assembly's point of view there are doubts about the appropriateness of delegated inspections supported by law and about the effectiveness of self-inspections conducted by local authorities, while local authorities argue about the realization of local autonomy and the too-frequent recurrence of inspections.
Despite opposition regarding local government inspections by the National Assembly, in reality, given the increasing proportion of subsidy businesses employed by local authorities, 1) and the inadequacy of their self-inspection systems, 2) simply abolishing local government inspections is not a recommended strategy, and also does not consort with the role and responsibility of the National Assembly as determined in the Constitution and related laws. Also, since the implementation of local governance, despite the expansion of autonomy and independence following increased local decentralization, the degree of responsibility, efficiency, and success in conflict management of local administrations have been evaluated as poor (Kim et al., 2002; Kong, 2009; Yeum, 2012) . Scandalous events such as illegal budget execution and the 1) According to data from the office of assemblyman C. S. Kim (2008: 14) , the proportion of assistance businesses in local authorities increased from 40.6 percent in 2010 to 43.4 percent in 2013, and even in Seoul, which had the lowest level of assistance, the 2013 business ratio increased by 5.6 percent compared to 2010. This means that while local finances are still in a poor condition, the dependence on national finance is high.
2) Cho (2010) organizations, paternalism and insufficient result disclosure show that there is still a need to modify the inspection system relating to local authorities.
corruption of civil servants have continually occurred and are even seen sometimes as being on the increase, and these serve as a crucial obstacle to the revitalization of the local autonomy system (Yeum, 2012: 1) . Even after the establishment and enforcement of the Public Audit Act, the self-inspection system used by local authorities still manifests problems regarding the independence of auditing institutions, the professionalism of audit personnel, and lack of administrative control by local councils (Kim et al., 2002; Kong, 2009; Cho, 2010 (Lee, 2002; Lim, 2011; Jung, 2009) , at this time the need for local government inspections should be reaffirmed and discussions concerning future improvements should take place.
Accordingly, the present research aimed at reasserting the need for parliamentary inspections via theoretical discussion, analyzing the management problems faced by local government inspections (including those conducted by the National Assembly focused on discussion on the question of maintenance or abolition of the system provided by existing preceding research), and presenting development plans for local government inspections by the National Assembly. A literature review on domestic and foreign local government inspections was conducted to provide supplementary information.
Ⅱ. The significance and current status of local government inspections of the National Assembly
The significance of parliamentary inspections
The parliamentary inspection system is an activity whereby the National Assembly examines and questions overall state affairs (Lee, 2002: 295 enshrine the people's right to know, the principal condition for the realization of popular sovereignty; those conducting them serve as agents of the people, gathering information about the state's activities that people wish to know. This is a useful means of helping people to make political decisions (Kim, 2008 (Kim, : 1350 Jung, 2011: 134 Article 61 of the Constitution provides grounds for the National Assembly to inspect or investigate specific administrative affairs. Articles 127-9 define the basic data for parliamentary investigations and inspections, and more specific details are included in the law on parliamentary investigation and inspection. According to this, the first clause of Article 2 of the law on parliamentary investigation and inspection determines that inspections of overall state affairs will be conducted 20 days a year on a periodic basis. They are conducted by the responsible standing committee mentioned in Article 37 of the National Assembly law, and in principle are targeted on all aspects of administrative affairs: legislation, administration, and jurisdiction. Also, under Article 12
3) For specific data on changes in parliamentary inspection system regulations see Jung (2011) .
of the law on parliamentary investigation and inspection, the findings are made public and duties are given to inspected agencies such as administrations. Meanwhile, the law has legal force to guarantee implementation.
As long as specific regulations on reports, document submission, requests for witness attendance and verification relating to parliamentary inspections do not exist, the relevant persons or agencies must oblige, and in cases of disobedience, noncompliance, oath swearing or perjury, accusations can be made. Also, the administration or related agencies must report the results of parliamentary inspections to the National Assembly when correction or disposal of information is requested, and the National Assembly can take adequate measures to implement these reports (Jang, 2004: 45) .
Parliamentary inspections by the National Assembly are essentially policy inspections aimed at central government, and corruption inspections aimed at frontline enforcement institutions. Local government inspections by the National Assembly contain a strong element of compulsion and control that is aimed at uncovering corruption and illegal behavior on the part of local authorities (Park, 2002: 52) . As a result, they are conducted in accordance with regulations set out in the Constitution so as to reveal and correct errors made by local authorities, the true site of state affairs, where more than half of the national budget is spent (Bae, 2002: 143 (Lim and Ham, 2000: 70) . 4) This shows that of all the primary legislative functions of assemblymen, parliamentary inspections are held to be among the most important.
Practical operation of parliamentary inspections 1) Timescales and methods
Under the law on parliamentary investigation and inspection, the standing committee independently decides upon enforcement of the investigation in the 30 days prior to 4) According to Lim and Ham (2000) , 
Organizations belonging to the target organizations under the Board of Audit and
Inspection Act which are seen as requiring inspection by the plenary session.
Inspections of first-tier local authorities, such as those of metropolitan cities and provinces, are limited to nationally delegated affairs and businesses financially supported by the Government, such as via subsidies (Article 7, issue 2). Inspection of local authorities can be conducted by a combined group of two or more committees (Article 7, issue 2). 5) As shown in Table 1 , the number of local authorities to be inspected by National Assembly could be not many but limited in practice.
3) Institutional proceedings for parliamentary inspections
The proceedings for parliamentary inspections can be divided into three stages:
preparation, inspection stage, and result management. As regards the specific proceedings, given that the X is unchanged, the chair of each standing committee consults with the steering committee, and prepares an inspection-plan document that contains information about the target organizations, the formation of an inspection team, the inspection date, and so on. These are decided in committees by vote.
However, in the case of authorizing institutions that require the authorization of the Also, when the time at which parliamentary inspections are to take place has to be changed, the National Assembly's Steering Committee votes for a 'change to the date of parliamentary inspections' prior to the opening day of a regular plenary session of the National Assembly (every tenth of September), and the changed date is confirmed when put forward and voted for at the plenary session. Other proceedings are similar to those that take place when the date is not changed.
When a parliamentary inspection plan is confirmed, each standing committee can request reports and document submission, and the attendance of witnesses, appraisers and testifiers, but only when the committee has voted for this. Also, when a committee requests reports, document submission and witness attendance, the written request must include report items, the article and contents of the document, the time and place, the names of witnesses, the time of attendance, and the location. This and is forwarded to the administration or to related organizations.
In addition, regulations relating to parliamentary inspections include the following strategies for effectively guaranteeing the carrying out of inspections by the National Assembly:
1. The duty of organizations to withstand discomfort.
2. The warrant of accompanying.
Punishment of violations.
4. Accusation to the prosecution.
5. The duty to report the results of management made owing to requests for correction and other causes. 
2) Scope
There is no official manual for parliamentary inspections by the National Assembly, Assembly's range of inspection rights regarding local authorities (Lee et al., 2002: 58) .
In other words, according to the relevant law, it should be seen that the National Assembly can conduct inspections not only on national delegated affairs and national affairs supported by government subsidies, national affairs entrusted to local authorities and their heads and provincial/city affairs that are inspected by province/city councils, but may when necessary conduct them also, directly, on target organizations and on the results of inspections conducted by province/city, city/county and district councils.
However, conducting another inspection when results from inspections by local councils already exist can create a political burden and attract criticism, so the aim of the laws relating to parliamentary inspections conducted on previous results should be seen as being simply to supplement inspection by the National Assembly (Lee, 2002: 297) .
Accordingly, the targets of local government inspections by the National Assembly can be viewed as follows. Local government inspections by the National Assembly are basically limited to national affairs managed by local authorities and their heads.
Therefore, the National Assembly cannot conduct inspections on the autonomous affairs of local authorities, but can perform inspections and investigations relating to other collectively delegated and agency-delegated affairs.
The purpose of excluding autonomous affairs from parliamentary inspection targets is to prevent repetitive inspections and respect the autonomous rights of local authorities, and since the National Assembly can exert the right to inspect every national organization it may be said that it can also inspect delegated affairs (Park, 2002: 19) .
However, the problem with current local government affairs is that not only is the percentage of delegated affairs high, but also, there is an unclear distinction between autonomous affairs and national delegated affairs (Baek, 2011: 320 
Local government inspection systems in the USA
The USA has adopted a system which strictly follows the separation of powers, and so under the constitution the National Assembly does not have any supervisory authority over the administration. On the other hand, the US system succeeded that of the UK and so has, since the colonial era, acknowledged the performance of auxiliary functions that involve the National Assembly through the investigative power of Parliament, and these functions are vitalized (Lee et al., 2002: 52 3. The passing of the law on singular inspection in 1984 rendered state and local authorities that receive more than $100,000 in subsidies targets for inspection.
Previously, although state and local authorities that received subsidies from the federal government needed to be inspected, if a local authority received different subsidies it had to be inspected each time this occurred, and the standards of inspection were unclear.
To sum up, in the USA where the separation of power is strictly adopted and local government is in principle under local council rather than the Congress, parliamentary inspection system of local government is not accepted. 
Local government inspection systems in Japan

Differently from central government, local government in the UK is inspected by
Audit Commission, which is independent from central and local government in real terms.. The role of audit in the control of local authorities and the limitation of local autonomy has been a significant feature of the history of local government in the UK (Panara and Varney, 2013:357) . Independent auditors serve to place significant limit on the ability of local authorities to exercise local discretion in the level of funding and provision of services. subsidies and specific businesses, and (although differences between the countries exist) they are targeted also on the clarity of accounting results and performance inspection results. However, in these countries the right to conduct parliamentary investigations is a greatly weakened one, and, except in the USA, they are not conducted often.
On the other hand, the right for parliamentary inspections is a unique system only recognized in the Republic of Korea, and is significant in that it is a system needed for the National Assembly to adequately exercise the authorities granted by the constitution, and also that it is a strong means of securing administrative responsibility. Abolitionists argue that to inspect local matters that should be investigated by local councils is to violate the right to autonomy of local authorities, and thus goes against the basic principle of local governance (Park, 2002: 65) .
In addition, the fact that problems of repetitive inspections of local authorities have been mentioned in previous research suggests that local government inspections by the National Assembly should be abolished (Constitution Research Advisory Committee, 2009: 159) . In particular, Lee (2005: 523) states that, from a historical perspective, provision of the right to parliamentary inspections in the first constitution of Korea was due to a misunderstanding of the parliamentary investigation system, and is a system that cannot be observed in foreign cases. That is, members of the Constituent 6) However, there is a clear difference between parliamentary inspections and investigations in terms of range and purpose, and given the situation in Korea, in which the positive effects of parliamentary inspections cannot be denied, arguing for abolition solely on account of foreign cases is inappropriate. In fact, following the distinction being made between parliamentary inspections and investigations, the parliamentary inspection system has performed the important function of national control along with the parliamentary investigation system. This is important, in that the Korean system depends on a 'unique constitution' clause unknown in other countries, and it is argued that this system may elicit foreign interest in a comparative perspective (Jung, 2011: 147 Secondly, according to the law on parliamentary inspection and investigations, in principle, owing to the date restrictions on parliamentary inspections, which have to be conducted annually for 20 days beginning on the day following the regular session of the National Assembly, it is difficult for sufficient questions and answers to go by, and difficult also to secure effectiveness owing to insincere attitudes and post treatment.
Third, the term that best describes the relationship between the Government, which is the main agent of state affairs management, and the National Assembly, which is Assembly requests a vast amount of data from the Government, and the inspected government submits a large amount of data (Lim, 2011: 335, requoted) . Also, requests for unnecessary data are causing further problems (Kim et al., 2002: 199) . 
4) Inspections by local councils
This argument states that since, in local governance, the local council which checks the local government head can monitor and criticize the administration via the representation of residents, conducting parliamentary inspections as well is unnecessary.
The local council is a legislative organization that can determine the major policies or operation of local authorities and issues relating to the burdens of residents; it is a law-making organization that can establish regulations, and it has legal authority to monitor and check the enforcement organization through administrative affair inspections and investigations (Ahn, 2007: 41) . In particular, the administrative affair inspection of the local council is very important for the local council's control function, since it secures the administrative responsibility and efficiency of local authorities and helps to cement democracy. When administrative affair investigations and inspections become revitalized and self-inspections are made possible, parliamentary inspections will be unnecessary (Park, 2002: 66) . (Jung, 2011: 148) .
2) The National Assembly's control function regarding national affairs Assembly's control over national affairs (Lee et al., 2003: 41 (Ahn, 2007: 66) . This is because local assemblymen of the elective office cannot but gratify the demands of local residents, which leads to a 'popular' style of inspection, and this means that corruption exists (Sekye-ilbo Daily News, 2008.09.23) in the form of an adhesive relationship with local residents (Bae, 2002: 144) . Cho (2010) argues that one of the problems the current local government inspection system faces in strengthening the integrity of local finances is that local government leaders were granted an excessive amount of discretionary power by the law on public inspections, and thus it is necessary for parliamentary inspections by the National Assembly and other inspections on a national scale to be conducted until the independence of inspection organizations, the professionalism of inspection officers, and modifications to the overall inspection system can be assured.
Effecting a synthesis between abolitionist and retentionist viewpoints
Korea has made substantial improvements since the revival of the local autonomy system, and currently, discussion frequently takes place on the development of local autonomy based on the diversity and autonomy of local authorities. These discussions are resulting in biased understandings, such as demands for the independence of local administration, and for a drastic separation from central government. As can be seen from the previous discussion, although opinions concerning these problems are not presented without a certain level of validity, it cannot be denied that in the Korean context parliamentary inspections and investigations have been used to serve different purposes, and also that this has largely functioned as a means of periodically inspecting overall state affairs (Koh and Noh, 2011: 326) . Therefore, it is not rational to discuss the revitalization of parliamentary investigations as a means of permanent control of state affairs and the abolition of the parliamentary inspection system on the same level. In particular, when considering the relationship between local authorities and the state, the dependence of local authorities on central finance, and the inadequacy of a self-inspecting function, it becomes harder to accept arguments for the abolition of local government inspections by the National Assembly.
A desirable local autonomy system should be seen as having powers deriving from the state, even if it is a corporate entity independent from the state (Ahn et al., 2006) , and therefore it should be understood as natural that a certain level of supervision can be exercised by the state according to legal principles. Particularly when considering the basic ideology and legal system of a democratic nation under constitutional rule, it should be kept in mind that the local autonomy system should be realized along with simultaneously, the National Assembly should conduct parliamentary inspections from the perspective of political and policy rationality, instead of taking a control-focused approach.
(including autonomous affairs) are constitutional (Lim, 2011 Above all, despite previous research on local government inspections, in view of the positive functions of the parliamentary inspection system, and the inspection capacity and dependability of local authorities, it is difficult to accept that a valid argument can currently be made for the abolition of local government inspections. Moreover, since additions to institutional strategies and alternatives that improve the effectiveness of the parliamentary inspection system itself are being put forward, it is necessary to coordinate opinion, and agreements between local authorities and the National Assembly, regarding rational improvements to the parliamentary inspection system.
